Kemalism

Photograph of a statue depicting
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
By M. C. Dutt

Kemalism |
Thursday – August 5, 2026

Here in Türkiye (fmr. Turkey), the vision and ideology of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is still redolent on every street and in every home, for what Atatürk achieved in the early 20th century, following WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was nothing short of spectacular—note the man (Atatürk) himself in the image that I have attached to this post, and yes I took that picture on my trip to the small port city of Side, located about 46 miles outside of Antalya. Like him or not, Atatürk was the founder of the modern nation-state that is today Türkiye, and his vision of the six arrows—an integral part of Kemalism—has really made a profound impact on this land, read "The Law Of The Land". It was not until the actions and the advocacy of what was Türkyies founding father, that the formation of an assortment of different ethnic groups into Türkiye as a nation-state became possible, something that meant a complete transformation of the former defeated core of the empire into a great power on par with European powers such as France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Britain; for without Kemalism, the divided and defeated residues of the Ottoman Empire would have gone the way of the rest of the Middle East. Of course, it is also true that Kemalism, like many nationalisms, read "The Problem with Nationalism", took off greatly in the shadow of WWI and that the Ottoman Empire was completely defeated in that great and disastrous conflagration, but it is still worth noting, again, the seculirizing impact that Kemalism has had on Türkiye: it was not until Kemalism and, again, the formation of the modern nation-state of Türkiye, that secular laws took precedence over sacred laws, over Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh فقه), read "The Problem of Secular Law", and where politics (mass politics), in the modern sense, really became a part of the normal flow of life; before Kemalism, the idea of politics did only extend to matters, for the most part, within a certain social radius, and the idea of a separation between the state and the church, in the case of Türkiye mostly the mosque, was unheard of outside of radical and revolutionary circles. And indeed, Atatürk was a true revolutionary, a founding statesman in the same class of Vladimir Lenin, Thomas Jefferson, and Napoleon Bonaparte; there is certainly a certain sense of before and after Atatürk, in the history of Türkiye and in the history of this region, really stretching up to Romania and Bulgaria, two former integral parts of the European side of the Ottoman Empire.

    Of course, much can be said about Atatürk, because he is such an integral part of Türkiye that it would be true to say, something that I believe that I have alluded to above, that without Atatürk there would be no Türkiye, but what interests me more than the man himself, is his ideology, as an alternative to brute nationalism and hysterical populism—because both nationalism and populism are central pillars of Kemalism, indeed they make up two of the six arrows mentioned above—that has proven to be able to still manage to integrate a certain corporative sense within the nation, something that is strikingly similar to the Scandinavian model; here we are not dealing with something that is nameless and inscrutable, because we can actually see the consequences through when it comes to Kemalism and this is why Atatürk, like the true revolutionary and founding statesman that he was, is still celebrated here among the people, for they are not one without him; the Turkish identity would simply not exist without Kemalism. I suppose too, that it would be somewhat accurate to describe Kemalism as a successful attempt to bring almost the entirety of the core principles of the enlightenment to the forefront in a heartbeat, and this is why many people still defend the autocracy of Atatürk, really they recognize that for Türkiye, a stable and successive transition away from theocratic totalism towards some kind of democratic statism was necessary – and they find this in Atatürk and his Kemalism. But it is also no less false to suggest that when we consider all things, Kemalism is not really that revolutionary, at least not compared with the trend of the global ambient political discourse at the time or indeed today, for Kemalism is not Bolshevism, Kemalism does not advocate the complete overthrow of the natural order, even though it calls for the first steps in that direction, read "Hierarchy"; no, indeed it would be fair to characterize Kemalism as a kind of Social Democracy with Turkish characteristics, and while Social Democracy can be quite disastrous, it is no longer anything that could be considered revolutionary, for the world has moved in a direction far away from the natural order, and under such circumstances we must also consider the fact that certain terms may simply not apply, for the times have changed all around the term itself, and this is why no language may be static, read "Notes on Reading", at least this is what we are made to take for facts by the proponents of the "Progress Maxim", and since Kemalism is very much about social and economic progress, it is necessary to familiarize ourselves with the relevant terms; this not implying that we have to accept this usage of the terms.

    Now, it does stand clear to reason then, that Kemalism is similar to Social Democracy and many other foundational beliefs, and the point of this post has not been to provide glowing praise about Kemalism, but it is to say that Kemalism, apart from most other isms, still appears to play a limited role here in Türliye. Now, there are many Western and Eastern points of views from which you can be sure to criticize Türkiye, provided you actually subscribe to those points of views, but at the end of the day, I do not believe that any views in this regard are more valid than the others, as they all tend to converge towards the same thing, read "The End of History". Of course, as an ideology Kemalism is clearly getting old and is on par with something like Personism (Justicialism), and this can be seen in how hard it really is to understand Kemalism through the ever shifting sands of modern political discourse. Quite simply put: I do not believe that this ideology is holding up much longer, but as a story of resurrection of some kind, I believe that Kemalism will keep telling the story of the Turkish nation, similar to how many Americans view the story of their nation, or the birth of their nation, in their case through the narrative of liberation, and much like the Americans the Turks will be sure to hold in their mind a great narrative, but a narrative not so much about liberation but rather about enlightenment. Can this be viewed as the state stepping in to replace the role of God? Of course, but this is surely not only a Turkish story.

Reginald Drax (AKA, M. C. Dutt) – August 6, 2026.